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Abstract 
While it is acknowledged that public participation in the policy-making process is a 
cornerstone of democracy, it is unclear how this takes shape in transitioning democracies. 
Myanmar is currently transitioning from over five decades of military rule to a civilian-led, 
democratically-elected government. Consequently, public space has opened up, allowing 
Myanmar citizens to express their opinions and needs vis-à-vis policies in multiple sectors and to 
engage with policymakers. The majority of these advocacy efforts has been spearheaded by civil 
society actors, who have been supporting citizens in expressing themselves and facilitating 
opportunities for direct engagement. This paper is a case study of a Myanmar civil society 
organization’s ongoing policy advocacy initiative. It aims to contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge on how civil society actors work to influence policy in sensitive political contexts. 
The researcher examined program documents and interviewed various program stakeholders and 
civil society actors to gain insight into the advocacy context, the advocates, the policy issues, the 
politics/decision-makers, and the advocacy strategies deployed by the initiative. The evidence 
suggests initial expectations were high for engagement with the civilian administration. Due to 
unforeseen changes in the policy-making context, it has been harder to make inroads than 
expected. This case study indicates one primary factor for success is relationship-building among 
all concerned stakeholders, particularly engagement with state actors by civil society actors.  
Furthermore, alliances among civil society actors advance the advocacy agenda further. Finally, 
citizen voice is important in sensitive political environments, particularly in a transitioning 
democracy like Myanmar, where civil society organizations are not fully trusted.  
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Introduction 
Civil society’s participation and contribution in the policymaking process has long been 
viewed as being integral to a robust democratic society. However, theory does not always 
translate well into practice. It is for this reason that I proposed my research project – to examine 
how policy advocacy takes place in a transitioning democracy. In particular, I wanted to examine 
civil society’s role and contribution to policy advocacy in Myanmar1, by undertaking a case 
study of a non-governmental organization (NGO)-led policy advocacy initiative in the policy 
areas of land, seed, forestry, and private investment.  
Myanmar has been transitioning from a military-ruled system to that of a democratically-
elected government for the past nine years. With the shift from military-led rule to primarily 
civilian-led rule, there were expectations that the current National League for Democracy (NLD) 
government would be the panacea that the country had been desperately awaiting. Both 
international donors and internal stakeholders expected that the NLD government would be a 
responsive, democratic regime that is sensitive to citizens’ needs. In addition, there was an 
expectation that there would be greater opportunity for citizens and civil society groups, who had 
played an active role in the ongoing political transition, to engage constructively with the 
government. However, these early expectations and assumptions appear to be the opposite of 
what is really happening. It is within this context that the research takes place.  
 
1 Myanmar is the officially recognized English name for the country. However, the reader may be familiar 
with the use of Burma for the country by democracy and human rights activists. The activists claim that the name 
change took place unilaterally and unconstitutionally by the military junta in 1989, without consultation with the 
citizenry. There are also various contentions as to whether the name is truly representative of all ethnic groups 
residing in the country. The reader should note that English spelling conventions for place names in Myanmar are 
often used interchangeably. With respect to place names in this essay, I will use the recognized convention in 
general discussion. The name of the country and various places referenced in the study remain unchanged in 
Burmese and is pronounced the same. 
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The concept of food sovereignty is broad-reaching as it refers to the rights of people, 
communities, and countries to determine their own agricultural and food policies (La Via 
Campesina, 2003). Metta Development Foundation (Metta), the organization which is leading 
the policy advocacy initiatives in my case study, further specifies that these rights are tied to 
unique, local socio-economic, cultural, and ecological conditions, and that people have access to 
both “safe, nutritious, and culturally appropriate food” and to the ability and resources to produce 
said food to sustain themselves and their societies (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015). Given that 
Myanmar is primarily an agricultural country, where approximately 70% of the labor force is 
working in the agricultural sector (DOP, 2016, p. 11), food sovereignty is an issue of interest to 
the citizenry. It is, therefore, evident that land and forests, seeds for agriculture, and private 
investment in the agriculture sector are important policy issues for Myanmar’s development. 
These issues are of even greater concern as the country’s economy opens up further to integrate 
with the global economy, and pressure is being brought to bear on the government to accelerate 
economic growth and rural development. However, there are inequity issues caused by 
underlying social and ethnic tensions and fifty decades of mismanagement that need to be 
resolved.   
The focus of the case study is the Right to Food (RtF) project implemented by Metta in 
three different geographical areas of Myanmar: Kachin state, northern Shan state, and southern 
Shan state.2 It is a donor-funded initiative that focuses on promoting the food sovereignty of 
local communities by supporting local civil society to engage in policy advocacy with local and 
national policymakers and decisionmakers in the policy areas of land, seeds, forestry, and private 
 
2 Northern Shan and southern Shan state are part of the larger Shan state, which is the largest ethnic state in 
Myanmar. However, under the previous military junta, it was divided into three administrative areas – northern 
Shan, southern Shan, and eastern Shan. While this division has been reversed, the ethnic make-up and geographical 
scope of Shan state has led Metta to continue maintaining this division. 
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investment policy frameworks and governance systems. In this project, Metta, a local NGO, is 
working in partnership with Oxfam in Myanmar, an international NGO (INGO), and numerous 
local civil society organizations (CSOs). Metta is the funding recipient, with funding coming 
from the Dutch government through Oxfam Novib, i.e., Oxfam in the Netherlands. The project’s 
theory of change is provided in Annex A. Designed to be a three-year project, it began 
implementation in mid-2016; it has since been extended for another year, until 2020.  
The intended impact of the project was described in the project proposal (see Annex A) as: 
Smallholder farmers, landless and forest dwelling women and men in 90 villages in 
Kachin, Northern and Southern Shan provinces in Myanmar realise their right to food 
sovereignty, in-line with Metta’s Food sovereignty model and Oxfam International 
Strategic Plan’s commitment on sustainable food. (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015, p. 13) 
The intended primary beneficiaries are smallholder farmers, landless and forest-dwelling men 
and women in these communities. RtF intends to help the project participants realize their right 
to food sovereignty by building their capacity and utilizing various methods and avenues to 
influence policy at micro, meso and macro levels. As such, the project is designed to strengthen 
CSO capacity at the local level to enable rural-based stakeholders, who are often left out of the 
conversation around project design and project leadership, to affect and achieve policy change. 
To do so, Metta and its project partner, Oxfam, have worked together to conduct stakeholder 
analysis and formulate appropriate advocacy strategies. Oxfam’s primary role is to provide any 
technical support vis-à-vis advocacy that may be necessary.  
At the conceptual stage, Metta planned to mobilize farmers in communities where it has 
implemented Farmer Field School3 and community forestry projects, to raise awareness and 
 
3 Farmer Field School is a project approach that Metta has traditionally utilized to provide agricultural 
skills training and input for farming communities with whom it works. Rather than taking the farmer trainees out of 
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gather evidence from communities to illustrate the necessity for the requested policy changes. 
Metta also planned to work together with farmer representatives from the three diverse project 
areas to facilitate building alliances at local, state and national levels, so that their advocacy 
actions would be more effective.  
However, once implementation began, Metta redesigned the project approach to include 
engagement with local CSOs as project partners. This was because Metta recognized that local 
CSOs are key actors who can be supported to build a stronger, more robust, and sustainable 
advocacy platform (Thura, personal communication, December 20, 2018). Further, these CSOs 
have more traction, interest, and capacity to engage in policy advocacy efforts at local, state, and 
national levels. Therefore, in addition to leveraging Metta’s existing in-depth contact and 
relations with communities, its partnership with the local CSOs would ensure a more effective 
and successful policy advocacy strategy. 
Thus, this case study is a vehicle to better understand and capture advocacy initiatives 
being led by CSOs, especially exploring how these initiatives take shape in sensitive political 
contexts such as Myanmar. It also explores the following sub questions: What are the 
contributing factors in determining advocacy strategies and targets? What are the results of 
advocacy actions with respect to their objectives to date? What are the opportunities and 
challenges for the citizen advocates and the supporting organization? Are there missed 
opportunities? If so, why? What are the lessons learned and implications for the future, vis-à-vis 
citizen advocacy. 
 
the familiar environment, the trainer, often a local farmer who has received an intensive season-long training, 
mobilizes his neighboring farmers and establishes a demonstration plot. The farmer-trainer then demonstrates 
different farming practices and facilitates discussions and hands-on learning. 
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Conceptual frameworks 
In order to address the topics raised by my research question, it is first necessary to 
clarify the key concepts raised within it. Therefore, this section will briefly summarize the 
literature review conducted in an attempt to define the key elements of my research: policy 
advocacy, civil society, and governance. I will also delimit the scope of analysis for 
understanding policy advocacy. 
Policy advocacy  
To begin with, it is important to define the term ‘policy advocacy’. VeneKlasen and 
Miller (2008) note that advocacy is a broad term that can refer to different initiatives that involve 
different groups of people, targets, purposes, and means and can be organized in different forms. 
However, policy advocacy can be broadly defined as any attempt to influence those with 
decision-making powers for the benefit of a common collective (Mosley, 2010; Li, Lo & Tang, 
2016; Onyx et al, 2010). For the purposes of my case study, Unsicker’s (2014) definition of 
policy advocacy will be applied: 
Policy advocacy is the process by which individuals, NGOs, other civil society 
organizations, networks, and coalitions seek to attain political, economic, cultural, and 
environmental rights by influencing policies, policy implementation, and policy-making 
processes of governments, corporations, and other powerful institutions. (p. 4) 
With this definition in mind, it is unsurprising that policy advocacy has gained traction among 
development actors as a vehicle for positive social change and social development. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, development assistance focused on service delivery, emphasizing needs-based 
approaches, i.e., meeting the basic needs of the target communities. However, starting in the 
1990s and to the present day, the focus has shifted to rights-based approaches, the rationale being 
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that when individuals and communities are able to access their basic human rights, their needs 
will subsequently be met as well. Hence, duty-bearers, i.e., those in positions of influence and 
power, particularly the state, must be held to account and must be encouraged to formulate and 
implement policies that will facilitate the citizenry’s access to their rights, which includes 
protection of individual rights and delivery of basic public services. This same trend has also 
been observed in Myanmar. As the political space opened up, international donors have 
increasingly shifted their focus from direct development assistance channeled through NGOs to 
encouraging NGO applicants to undertake policy advocacy initiatives.  
While it is familiar for those in liberal political systems, at first glance, policy advocacy 
appears to be an alien concept for civil society and activists in less open political systems. Due to 
the various nuances attached to the term, it is also hard to translate it into other languages, 
particularly in the global south, or to convey the essence of what it is in a few, easy-to-
communicate words. It is often a concept introduced by Western NGOs to local civil society 
organizations, especially to initiate campaigns for social justice and political change. This often 
leads to confusion on the part of the local actors because of problems of translation. One 
Peruvian activist has noted:  
We’re not certain whether we have a translation for ‘advocacy’ or whether we should just 
use the word ‘advocacy’ in English. Part of the confusion has to do with the way the 
concept was imported from the outside as if it were a new technology – as if we don’t 
already know advocacy… (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2008, p. 17).  
This is similar to the experience of Metta staff. When they were first introduced to the concept at 
the beginning stages of the project, Metta staff discussed what advocacy meant, and in turn, what 
policy advocacy was. This was followed by a debate about if the term should or could be 
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translated into Burmese (and other local languages), whether to just translate the term directly, or 
find an approximation of the concept the two words captured. It was clear from the outset, 
however, that there was no easy, direct translation. While it is clear what is meant by policy, and 
the word itself is easily translatable into Burmese, at times the translation failed to convey the 
idea that “policy” encapsulates a broad array of state instruments that focus on one thematic area 
(see discussion below on the definition of policy advocacy). It is also difficult to translate the 
nuances of advocacy because there is no direct approximation. While advocacy is broadly 
understood in English as an attempt to influence decision-makers, the concept of influencing 
(when translated directly) can have negative cultural connotations. When combining the two 
concepts together, it then becomes cumbersome to use the literal/direct translation repeatedly in 
every day parlance. Due in part to this issue of semantics, Metta continued using the English 
term in subsequent references. The use of the term in English makes it a more alien concept than 
it necessarily is, with the result being that it may at times appear to be a more challenging 
endeavor for advocates to undertake than it otherwise would be.  
Civil society  
As with policy advocacy, ‘civil society’ is a term that has been used on a widespread 
basis in recent decades, particularly in politics and in the development arena. Its exact meaning 
and essence have been debated by philosophers and political theorists from ancient Greece to the 
present day. Aristotelian tradition posits civil society as one whose constituents work together to 
establish common laws and values (Rathod, 2012a). Thomas Hobbes and John Locke carry on 
this tradition further by defining it as a “legitimate political order based on rights of its members” 
and is “a coterminous with effective governing institutions embodied in commonwealth” 
(Rathod, 2012a, p. 1). Adam Smith, G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx extend the concept from a 
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pure political one, to involving economic dimensions (He, 2012). Over the years, according to 
Ferguson, the notion of civil society has become one where it functions “not merely as an arena 
of civic association and free exchange but as a moral sphere and…a space for mutual service, 
grounded in clearly defined moral principles” (Rathod, 2012, p. 3). Rathod (2012a) notes that it 
has in fact evolved to somewhat of an aspiration and a fetish but has been useful in 
understanding “the sovereignty of the nation-state, the meaning of citizenship…and the nature of 
public sphere” (p. 3). He further notes that “[c]ivil society is a relational term because it has 
relation with many other interdependent terms” (p. 3). Civil society then reemerged as a popular 
notion in the wake of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, where the populace played an 
active and visible role in pressuring their governments to transition to democracy. It came to be 
understood as comprising entities independent of government control and was closely linked 
with the promotion of democratic society. It is also the basis for the conventional definition that 
is widely accepted now: “Civil society includes civic and social associations that are not part of 
the state, private sector, or the extended family…[which] may be seeking to advance broad social 
interests, narrow group interest, or even narrower individual interests” (United Nations Public 
Administration Network [UNPAN], n.d.).  
The question which then arises is what comprises civil society. Local and voluntary civic 
and social groups are easily identified as civil society groups. They clearly have direct 
representational bases which they can rely on to generate what Putnam calls “social capital” that 
enables them to garner attention and legitimacy by those in authority and the wider public 
(Mosley, 2016; Ottaway, 2012; Putnam, 2000). The debate largely revolves around 
professionalized non-governmental organizations’ status as civil society organizations. Ottaway 
(2012) notes that they generate little social capital and are not truly representative, but they do 
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“broaden the range of interests expressed in the political process,” and also play an important 
role in the delivery of public services, especially in developing countries (pp. 164-173). Ottaway 
also notes that civil society organizations’ relationship with the state varies and often takes one of 
three forms – ignoring and avoiding; opposing; or seeking to influence state policies. Finally, she 
describes civil society as being composed of professionalized non-governmental organizations 
which were encouraged to “[develop] government by the people and for the people” (pp. 164-
173). In this sense, civil society is not politically neutral but is seen as a vehicle for government 
regime change, popular civic participation, and empowerment. According to Rathod (2012b), 
“[civil] society offers opportunity to realize freedom, equality, and solidarity in present social 
and political situations” (p. 263).  
Civil society in Myanmar, in the form of civic and voluntary welfare groups, has long 
been active (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2015). However, during the extended military and 
quasi-military rule which lasted from 1962 to late 2000s, the ability of civil society groups to 
participate and contribute to national political processes was severely curtailed. Any existing 
groups were limited to communal welfare and religious affairs, while other national level 
organizations were usually government-organized, government-sanctioned organizations. After 
the agricultural heartland of Ayeyarwady Region suffered widespread devastation from Cyclone 
Nargis in 2008, the military government of the day tacitly allowed more civil society groups to 
mobilize and engage with communities directly. State and CSO relations were always uneasy 
however, as the then government (and successive administrations) viewed CSOs with mistrust as 
the bulk of their funding originated from international donors. In other words, Myanmar CSOs 
were often seen as mouthpieces/instruments of foreign interests.  
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Governance 
In order to better understand the importance of policy advocacy and the interplay of civil 
society within the pursuit of policy advocacy, the concept of governance needs to be clarified. It 
is derived from Classical Greek and means to pilot steer or direct, but it is now used to refer to 
“the attempts of governments or other actors to steer communities, whole countries, or even 
groups of countries in the pursuit of collective goals” (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009, p.2). More 
specifically, the UN defines it as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority 
to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, 
meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNPAN). 
This rather mechanical definition is given normative value when people use the term 
“good governance.” Good governance, often paired with civil society, has become common in 
the parlance when discussing pathways to development. There are, in general, four attributes to 
good governance – legitimacy, accountability, competence, and respect for law and protection of 
human rights (UNPAN). The ideal form of the state (or government) is then seen to be one which 
is sensitive to the needs, desires, and rights of its citizens, which leads to the rise in popularity of 
participatory processes in governance. Whereas before governance processes tended to be top-
down and policies were prescribed by those in power, they have now shifted to processes which 
should ideally include informed input from the citizenry and are held accountable by the 
electorate. This has led to our modern understanding of civil society becoming a condition for 
sustaining a democracy and the necessity of its role in holding the duty-bearers to serve the 
interest of their constituents. 
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Good governance is of particular interest for the Myanmar citizenry given the country’s 
political history. Having endured over six decades of authoritarian rule, where policy decisions 
were made by top leadership with little to no inputs from technical experts and communities, and 
where corrupt practices were pervasive, Myanmar citizens are now eager to hold state actors 
accountable and to participate in, or at least contribute to, policy-making processes.  
Analytical framework for policy advocacy initiatives 
 To understand the different dimensions of the policy advocacy process in my case study, I 
will utilize Unsicker’s (2014) advocacy circles framework (pp. 17-19). This framework is based 
on Unsicker’s (2014) definition of policy advocacy and is designed to help advocates understand 
the advocacy initiatives they are involved in by considering various interlocking dimensions. 
There are six dimensions of analysis, five of which are captured in the diagram below. At the 
center of the analytical framework is an analysis of the advocates – the actors working to 
influence and affect the policy in question – how they are organized and their motivation for 
being involved in the advocacy. Context refers to the political-economic-cultural environment in 
which the policy advocacy action is being carried out. Policy, politics, and strategy are the who, 
what, and how of the advocacy action. Policy lays out the parameters of the problem and 
identifies solutions that the advocacy action addresses. Politics identifies the formal and informal 
systems in which the advocates must operate, including other actors they need to interact with, or 
account for, in the course of their advocacy efforts. Strategy is the plan of action that the 
advocates develop to achieve their policy advocacy objective(s). Monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning are the final dimensions of the analysis, but are not indicated in a separate circle of their 
own, because Unsicker notes that these are functions that should be integrated into each of the 
other five dimensions. Utilizing this framework will be helpful to frame the ongoing RtF 
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advocacy efforts in Myanmar vis-à-vis conventional policy advocacy lens and address the 
research question (see page 14).  
Positionality 
As a researcher, my identity is best described as a “halfie” (Abu-Lughod, 1991), as my 
background and experiences are a blend of different cultures resulting from my upbringing, 
international education and ethnic heritage. I straddle the “outsider-insider” boundary by virtue 
of being a citizen of Myanmar and conducting my research within the country and with the 
organization I have worked for extensively. Yet my perspective is affected by my personal 
background. I am not a member of any of the ethnic groups living in the project areas, and 
furthermore, I was brought up and educated abroad during my formative years. I have a close 
relationship with the Metta senior staff and many other staff members, including project staff, 
context 
policy politics 
strategy 
advocates 
Figure 1: Advocacy Circles from Confronting Power: The Practice of Policy Advocacy (p. 
17), by J. Unsicker, 2014, Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press 
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because I worked there for over eight years. I am familiar with the project and have my own 
insights into the project’s objectives and approach because of my prior involvement with the 
start-up activities. I leveraged my personal connections with Metta to gain access to the RtF 
project staff and project partners so that I could collect information. In the process of doing so, I 
respected Metta’s and the individual respondents’ sensitivities, by not pushing them to 
participate in the interviews/discussions or to answer questions that they are not willing/able to 
respond to. I was guided by the local experts, who are locally based staff members, in identifying 
interview respondents and structuring the interview questions. Throughout the data collection 
and analysis processes, I self-reflected constantly to ensure that my biases were not affecting the 
quality of information, openly acknowledging my transnational identity and respecting the 
nuances of the socio-cultural context in which the program has been implemented.  
Ethics 
The semi-structured discussions were conducted to ensure that the discussants would be 
able to speak with the researcher openly and honestly. To facilitate this, the discussant(s) were 
asked to identify a meeting time and place that would be convenient for them. As the issues 
discussed in our conversations could be sensitive, care was taken to protect the participants’ 
anonymity and confidentiality. Consent was obtained from each individual person through 
consent forms that provided details about the research topic, research approach, interview 
procedures, promise of anonymity and highlighted the fact that participation is entirely 
voluntary, with no monetary or in-kind compensation being offered. To protect the respondents’ 
identities, their names have been replaced with pseudonyms in this paper. 
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Credibility 
To the extent possible, I attempted to capture data from different sources and using 
different means so as to triangulate the data. Therefore, I examined project documentation and 
official documents, conducted interviews, and observed a similar advocacy event. These 
different methodologies enable me to present more complete findings.  
Methodology 
The study has been designed as a qualitative case study of a policy advocacy initiative 
that is being carried out in Myanmar under the management of a local non-governmental 
organization (NGO). To inform the research, I have reviewed available project documentation 
and carried out interviews with project participants and staff, as well as key informants who are 
able to provide information about the advocacy context and stakeholders.  
Data collection methods 
The research utilized two data collection methods: review of project documentation and 
semi-structured individual interviews and focus group discussions. The review of project 
documentation focused on harvesting salient information about the project rationale, results 
accomplished to date, and identification of challenges and/or opportunities for the project. The 
semi-structured discussions were designed to provide information about the advocacy context in 
Myanmar, insight into stakeholders who affect (or are affected by) policymaking at local, state, 
and national levels, the policy issues addressed by the project, the advocacy 
approaches/initiatives employed by the project, and opportunities and challenges as perceived by 
project participants (see Annex B for list of questions posed during the interviews).  While direct 
observation of project activities was not possible during the data collection timeframe, I did get 
an opportunity to observe an advocacy event that was hosted by Metta, which served as a proxy 
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field observation, given that the event was structured in a similar manner to those hosted by the 
project. This was a public event hosted by Metta in Pathein, Ayeyarwady region, in February 
2019, to which regional government ministers, agricultural department officials, CSOs, and 
NGOs attended. During this half-day meeting, farmer groups working with Metta in the region 
presented their participatory research findings relating to farmers’ rights protection law, pesticide 
and fertilizer laws, and farmland laws, highlighting their understanding of the rights and 
protections the law formally offered, gaps in the current legislation and implementation, and 
presenting their recommendations for the government’s consideration.  
Site. The study site is Myanmar, with the Right to Food program being implemented in 
three distinct geographical areas.  
Participant description. Interviews were conducted with 14 persons; two focus group 
discussions were facilitated with Metta project staff as well. The table below is a summary 
profile of the interviews and focus group discussions.  
Interview/Focus 
Group 
Location 
Number of 
Participants Participant Profile 
Male Female Total 
Metta RtF Project Team 
Focus Group 
Discussion 
Yangon 7 1 8 Senior project staff and field 
staff 
Follow-up 
interview 
1  1 Yangon-based RtF project 
coordinator 
Focus Group 
Discussion  
Southern 
Shan 
(Taunggyi) 
3  3 Southern Shan-based field staff 
(note: one respondent also 
participated in the Yangon FGD) 
Telephone 
Interview 
1  1 Southern Shan-based RtF project 
coordinator 
Project Partners 
Face-to-face 
interview 
Kachin 
(Myitkyina) 
1 1 2 Representatives of RtF project 
partner organizations 
Southern 
Shan 
(Taunggyi) 
2  2  
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Northern 
Shan 
(Lashio) 
2 2 4  
Key Informant Interviews 
Face-to-face 
interview 
Yangon 3 2 5 Persons knowledgeable about the 
current Myanmar political 
context, civil society landscape, 
and agriculture sector 
Nay Pyi 
Taw 
1  1 Senior official from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock, and 
Irrigation 
Figure 2: Summary presentation of participants involved in the case study 
Semi-structured interviews and discussions with the Metta RtF project staff served to provide 
information about the project implementation. In addition, six key informant interviews were 
conducted to gain an understanding of Metta’s overall strategic agricultural advocacy approach, 
global advocacy perspective, and the current policy-making context in Myanmar. The 
respondents included: 
• one senior Metta staff member, who is external to the RtF project; 
• an expatriate Oxfam staff member who is Metta’s program counterpart and is familiar 
with the RtF program and has had extensive advocacy experience globally, providing 
valuable insight into Oxfam’s rationale for the project, analysis of the operational 
context, challenges and opportunities;  
• an elected Member of Parliament for Yangon Region’s Parliament;  
• a senior official from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation (MOALI);  
• a senior staff member of a prominent CSO that is active in civic policy advocacy; and  
• an independent political analyst and development consultant.  
Data management 
Keeping in mind the importance of safeguarding the participants’ privacy, I recorded the 
interviews on a password-protected smartphone. These were then uploaded to a cloud server to 
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ensure that the recordings would not be lost. For interviewees who declined my request to record 
the interviews, I took detailed notes during the interviews, taking care not to identify the 
respondent in the notes. I recruited a professional transcriptionist, who is unfamiliar with the 
project and interviewees, to transcribe the Burmese interviews. The transcriptionist did not 
receive any identifying information about the interviewees. Being proficient in Burmese, I was 
able to analyze and translate the interview data myself. 
Limitations and delimitations 
One of the limitations of this research project is that the scope of the advocacy initiative 
is very broad. The RtF project is not one advocacy campaign but is rather facilitating and 
fostering the growth of community-based advocacy initiatives in Myanmar for the long term. It 
is also an ongoing initiative. Therefore, a major challenge was that the unit of analysis was 
ambiguous and not as clear as expected at the outset of the research, nor are all activities 
complete. Focusing on Unsicker’s five policy circles was helpful in containing the analysis, but a 
long-term research project would have been more effective.  
In addition, due to time limitations, I did not get to observe project/advocacy activities 
directly. However, I did have the opportunity to review project documents and conduct in-depth 
interviews with project staff and project partners to gain insight into what is being done. I also 
observed a similar advocacy event in a different part of Myanmar, organized by Metta, that 
served as a proxy advocacy event, given that it was an advocacy event in the same thematic area 
and used a similar approach.  
Data analysis 
My research approach was grounded in the principles of ethnographic research while 
undertaking a case study of a project currently under implementation. I observed the project 
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environment directly and interacted with the project participants in their own domains. 
Furthermore, my familiarity and experience with the project context and approaches informed 
my analysis.  
I first undertook a deductive analysis of the interview data and available project 
documents. This deductive analysis was framed by Unsicker’s five advocacy circles. New 
patterns and categories that emerged were coded with in-vivo terms, using inductive analysis to 
frame unexpected information (Rossman & Rallis, 2017). The analysis was also informed by 
additional information from project documentation and personal insights. The insights which 
emerged have been analyzed and presented in the sections below, categorized under each 
category of Unsicker’s advocacy circles. The lessons learned section is an explicit compilation 
of practical recommendations formulated upon analysis of the information that was collected in 
my interviews with respondents. 
Furthermore, I wanted this research to be a mutually beneficial undertaking for both 
Metta and I. I did not want to merely extract information from the project, the organization, and 
the project partners for my own gain. I wanted the exercise and learnings the research generated 
to be an opportunity for internal reflection and a platform for improving advocacy strategies for 
the RtF project partners. To this end, I consulted with Metta as outlined above and shared the 
initial set of lessons learned for their reflection and feedback. This formed a basis for further 
discussion and reflection, which has enriched the findings I present in this paper. The final 
product will also be presented to Metta and its RtF project partners upon my return to Myanmar, 
after having given the capstone presentation at SIT. 
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Context 
As with any case study, it is important to understand the socio-political and economic 
context in which the advocacy action is being undertaken. The Myanmar context is defined by 
lagging rural development unequal central-periphery ethnic relations and resource distribution, 
as well as non-receptive attitudes towards civil society on the part of the government and policy 
processes that are not wholly transparent and at times contradictory. The complex narratives of 
Myanmar’s economic and political history are briefly outlined in the following sub-sections to 
provide the reader with a deeper understanding of this context.  
Myanmar’s economic and political developments (1962-present) 
Myanmar was ruled by different military regimes since 1962, when the military staged a 
coup against the then democratically elected government. Due to mismanagement and self-
imposed isolation, the country went from being a center of learning and commerce in Asia to 
being a pariah state. It endured a long fall from grace – from being known as the “rice bowl of 
Asia” in the early part of the twentieth century (AFP, 2015), it was classified as a Least 
Developed Country (LDC) by the United Nations (UN) in 1987 (Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs [DESA], n.d.). Moreover, it has endured continuous civil conflict in one form or 
another since its independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1948. In fact, these civil 
conflicts are among the world’s longest-running armed conflicts.  
Widespread protests, initially led by student activists, in 1988 culminated in the military 
government of the time stepping down and appointing another military-led regime in its place, 
with the promise to hold nationwide democratic elections and the development of a new 
constitution. However, these efforts were in vain. When it became clear that the main pro-
democracy party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), would win a majority of the seats 
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in the 1990 national elections, the pushback from the military-led “caretaker government” was 
severe and immediate. The military put the face of the opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, who also 
happens to be the daughter of Myanmar’s independence movement leader, under house arrest, 
jailed a countless number of activists, and refused to honor the election results. The intervening 
years saw the country become an international pariah, suffering under many Western-led 
sanctions. Domestically, the citizenry suffered under draconian rules and regulations, including a 
law that prohibited any gathering of more than five persons. Government policies were 
formulated and decided by the generals in charge. At times, policy decisions appeared to be 
made on the basis of personal preferences rather than rational thinking. There seemed to be little 
prospect for change, and if not for Cyclone Nargis in 2008, it would most likely have travelled 
on the same trajectory of continued military rule under different guises.  
Cyclone Nargis was the largest natural disaster in modern Myanmar history. The cyclone 
led to the deaths of over 130,000 people and affected the lives of over 2 million people. The 
disaster led an influx of international aid into the country. Observers of Myanmar’s political and 
social development have claimed that Nargis was the spark that led to the widening of space for 
Myanmar civil society (Morgan, 2015; Zin, 2012). Many local organizations and associations 
were formed and/or mobilized to assist cyclone-affected communities. At the same time, the 
military government held a national referendum that supposedly ratified the new constitution 
(reportedly backed by 93.82% of voters). This constitution, while allowing for the assumption of 
civilian rule, still ensures that the military plays an active role in the governance of the country. 
Twenty-five percent of all legislative seats are appointed military officers and the Chief of 
Defense Services, and ministers of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Border Affairs 
are appointed by the military. 
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This set the scene for national elections in 2010, which were won by the military-backed 
party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Soon after, Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
most prominent leader of the opposition, and other political prisoners were released. Foreign 
dignitaries (e.g., King Harald V, the King of Norway, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron, etc.) started visiting Myanmar. The new administration, headed 
by ex-general Thein Sein, promised to bring about development to the country. It was eager to 
present and maintain its reformer credentials to the outside world. Consequently, foreign 
sanctions were relaxed gradually. 
Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the NLD, were once again able to mobilize and 
campaign. In fact, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected as a member of parliament in the 2012 
national by-elections. As widely expected, the USDP subsequently lost the 2015 general 
elections. The NLD-led government was sworn into power. Aung San Suu Kyi sidestepped 
constitutional limitations, which prohibit anyone married to a foreigner from being head of state 
(thus barring Suu Kyi as she was married to a British citizen), by being appointed State 
Counsellor. She declared that she would be “above the president.” The political landscape is 
dominated by the NLD, while the military continues to exert its influence through its control of 
25% of the legislature and the key ministries. The military-affiliated USDP and smaller, more 
localized ethnic political parties constitute the remainder of the Myanmar legislature.  
Since 2010, Myanmar citizens have experienced greater personal freedoms with respect 
to mass, public mobilization and expression of opinions. The number of news publications 
increased exponentially and the censorship requirement for all publications (in place in different 
guises since the 1962 coup d’état) was lifted in August 2012. Public mass gatherings also 
became easier to organize. Official registration of NGOs also became streamlined and relaxed 
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since July 2014. Despite these gains, there has also been a slight contraction in press freedoms 
and freedom of speech of private citizens under the NLD administration, as evinced most 
noticeably by the detention, trial, and imprisonment of two Reuters journalists (Fullerton and 
Goldberg, 2018). The NLD and the military have also not shied away from taking legal action 
against writers, cartoonists, and CSO leaders who speak publicly, or post or share critical 
comments on social media (Zin, 2019).  
One of the foremost policy priorities for both the Thein Sein and NLD administrations 
has been promoting Myanmar’s development. This has duly been borne out in the various 
initiatives the governments have undertaken and promoted. As noted earlier, Myanmar has 
lagged behind most of the world in terms of social and economic development since the late 
1960s, being classified as an LDC in 1987 by the UN (DESA, n.d.). It also ranked quite low in 
the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI). It was only in the 2017 HDI report that Myanmar 
scored high enough across the various social and economic indicators to be deemed a medium-
ranked member (145 of 188 countries) (UNDP, 2017). Even so, it still lags developmentally 
behind its Southeast Asian neighbors (UNDP, 2018). According to the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning (2018) and UNDP (n.d.), 26% of the population was living below the poverty line in 
2015, but the poverty rate in rural areas is much higher – 23% in rural areas compared to 9% in 
urban areas. Although Myanmar is endowed with a wide range of valuable, high-earning natural 
resources, such as natural gas and oil, minerals and precious gems, timber and forest-related 
products, over one-third of the national GDP is still derived from the agriculture sector (FAO, 
n.d.). Moreover, the primary source of livelihood for 70% of the labor force in the country is 
agriculture (DOP, 2016). This is unsurprising as the 2014 census reported that 70% of the 
population live in rural areas (DOP, 2017). Therefore, government policies have focused on 
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encouraging economic growth and on poverty mitigation strategies. To this end, government 
policies have focused on industrialization and modernization of the agricultural sector (e.g. 
efforts to increase yield and focus on export-oriented crops), and inviting private investment to 
drive these two policy foci forward.  
Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts in the post-colonial period 
Accompanying the need for the country’s economic and rural development is the urgent 
need to bring about peace and stability in the ethnic areas of Myanmar. The government 
officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups as being indigenous to the country. Most of these ethnic 
“minorities” live in remote areas, with very limited access to basic social services, i.e. education 
and health services provision. This is counterbalanced by the fact that much of the revenue for 
the state originates in these ethnic areas, e.g., jade, teak, hydropower. The Bamar ethnic group 
has historically dominated Myanmar politics and control of resources. When Myanmar first 
received its independence from Britain in 1948, Bamar and ethnic political leaders agreed to a 
federal union arrangement that would ensure equitable representation and access to resources. 
However, continued Bamar hegemony, as well as instability wrought by left and right wings of 
Bamar political parties, did not see this agreement realized. As a result, the majority of ethnic 
groups in the country took up arms against the Bamar-dominated government and much of the 
country has been engulfed in armed civil conflicts of varying intensities since – making 
Myanmar home to one of the world’s longest conflicts. The main thrust of the ethnic armed 
organizations’ (EAOs) demands has been a more equitable political relationship and access to 
the wealth derived from the country’s natural resources, much of which is extracted from their 
areas of control. Kachin and Shan states were among the major hotspots of conflict. The Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) and its political organization, the Kachin Independence Organization 
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(KIO) have engaged both politically and militarily with the Myanmar government since the 
1960s. Shan state is demographically more diverse and is thus home to more ethnic militias and 
EAOs.  
In the early 1990s, the military junta (the State Law and Order Restoration Council or 
SLORC) engaged in talks with the ethnic armed groups, entering into a broad range of ceasefire 
agreements which guaranteed a level of administrative autonomy and natural resource extractive 
rights. The KIO was one of the signatories, and this agreement saw a cessation of armed conflict 
in Kachin state. Gradually, armed conflict in Shan state also ceased as the various EAOs active 
there engaged with the government, and were, in turn, granted various autonomous powers. That 
is not to say that the regions were absent of armed conflict, as smaller ethnic militias were still 
active and small-scale fighting broke out from time to time. However, tensions between the 
EAOs and the government of the day still lingered. The central government’s position has 
consistently been to approach the EAOs as operating outside the law and their negotiations have 
focused on bringing the ethnic armed groups under the military’s control. At the same time, only 
lip service was paid to political representation. This was visibly reflected in the 2010 elections 
when ethnic political parties loosely affiliated with the EAOs tried to register to contest seats in 
their areas, but were denied registration by the Election Commission. This has contributed to 
continued mistrust and reluctance to engage with the central, Bamar-centric government. 
Pressure had started building on the EAOS to disarm or to integrate their forces with the 
Myanmar military following the transition to quasi-civilian rule in 2010, but they did not bow to 
the pressure. Political discussions did not bear fruit. The tensions ultimately led to an outbreak of 
armed conflict in Kachin state in mid-2012, after which the fighting spread to northern Shan state 
where the KIA has a presence. This led to government forces engaging in armed conflict with 
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other EAOs in northern Shan state. This fighting has resulted in over 100,000 people being 
displaced from their home communities for prolonged periods, even up to the present day 
(UNOCHA, 2019). Southern Shan state is relatively stable, though there are still pockets of 
tension.  
The Thein Sein government launched an ambitious National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 
in March 2015, which saw eight EAOs engaging with the government on formal peace talks. 
Despite a tremendous amount of support (both financial and technical) provided primarily to the 
government from the international community, the majority of the EAOs remain distrustful of 
the negotiations (Kumbun, 2017; Weng, 2019). It has, in a way, become a white elephant project 
because no substantive gains have been made, while armed conflict in the ethnic areas continues. 
One of the criticisms is that while the EAOs are expected to make a lot of concessions, the 
military and the central government are acceding few of their own.  
The NLD government was welcomed with great anticipation, in part because the ethnic 
groups believed Aung San Suu Kyi and her party to be sympathetic to their concerns. After the 
NLD administration assumed power, they continued their efforts to drive the NCA process 
forward. In informal conversations, I have heard ethnic civil society leaders express increasing 
disenchantment and distrust of both Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD after 2015 because of their 
public bias towards the establishment’s interest and reluctance to engage with civil society, 
particularly representatives from ethnic organizations.  
NLD government’s engagement with civil society and decision-making processes  
Myo, a political analyst and development consultant, has noted that the mandate received 
by the NLD government from the majority of the population has dictated how the administration 
interacts with other stakeholders (personal communication, January 26, 2019). According to 
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Myo, the previous Thein Sein administration opened the space up for civil society engagement to 
counter weaknesses caused by low levels of political legitimacy (as it was still dominated by 
recently retired military generals, turned civilian politicians). This lack of political legitimacy 
was not an issue for the NLD government. In other words, he said, “[the NLD government] do 
not see the [CSOs] as being necessary from the institutional perspective; they already have 
legitimacy. They don’t need [to partner with CSOs]. This was unexpected – by CSOs and 
everyone” (personal communication, January 26, 2019).  
As much as the NLD administration is driving towards improving governance practices, 
old, untransparent practices remain. In informal interviews with me, civil society actors have 
mentioned contradictory, unwritten policies in government departments and in parliament, 
particularly among the political parties, which have thwarted their policy advocacy efforts.  
Advocates 
The advocates, as described by Unsicker, are those pushing for changes in policy. The 
advocates for the RtF project can be classified into three sub-groups. Metta Development 
Foundation, as the project holder and convener of the advocates is, in a way, the main 
protagonist. However, it has positioned itself as building a platform and providing critical 
support for the local civil society partners in the project areas. The second group of advocates are 
the local civil society project partners. The last group of advocates are advocacy actors who are 
not directly involved with the project but working on similar and parallel policy advocacy 
initiatives. Profiles of these sub-groups and further discussion of how these advocate groups 
interact with each other are detailed below.  
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Metta Development Foundation 
Metta is a Myanmar NGO established in 1998 by local peace negotiators and 
development workers. Its original objective was to engage in community-based, community-led 
development activities, building local capacity, so as to complement ongoing formal peace 
processes. It aspired to rebuild the lives of post-conflict communities in northern Myanmar, 
which was the focal area of its initial projects.  
It has since become a dual mandate organization. Metta’s work focuses on both 
development and humanitarian programming. Its current staff strength numbers over 650 people 
in five branch offices and headquarters. Its annual operational budget averages well over USD 5 
million (the 2018-2019 annual budget was USD 10 million). This budget enables Metta to serve 
over 1,000 communities each year. It works primarily with rural ethnic communities in Kachin, 
Kayah, Mon, and Shan states, as well as rural communities in Ayeyarwady and Bago regions. It 
is now one of the largest local NGOs and is well-regarded by both local and international 
partners. The primary program areas have been agriculture and forestry, early childhood 
education, water and sanitation, community-based HIV prevention, and community-based 
livelihood interventions. Its program approach emphasizes capacity building of local community 
members and supports them to enact their own visions. Metta’s latest organizational program 
strategy seeks to ensure that rural communities have the necessary capacities and resources by 
building on Metta’s prior experience, expertise, and the communities’ needs. The refocused 
priority sectors include food sovereignty and sustainable livelihoods (including agriculture and 
forestry, as well as land rights and natural resource management), essential services (education 
and health), humanitarian response, strengthening civil society (capacity building), and research 
and advocacy.  
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Metta’s projects are designed around the philosophy of empowering the community. 
Activities normally start with mobilizing community members to come together to identify 
issues of mutual concern, usually livelihoods and basic services. Participatory Action Research 
(PAR), which is essentially a research approach that involves participants from the target 
communities in the research process (from problem identification and situation analysis, to 
proposing solutions to the community development problem at hand), is the bedrock of Metta’s 
community mobilization activities. Community members then form a project management 
committee that can plan and manage the community development project activities. Following 
this, Metta provides the appropriate and necessary technical skills training (be it project 
management-related skills like facilitation and book-keeping, or directly related to project 
activities like agriculture, early childhood education or hygiene know-how), along with a small 
start-up grant and/or materials to complement whatever resources (monetary, labor, or in-kind) 
that the community itself is able to muster. Through the implementation process, Metta 
accompanies the community as they manage and implement project activities, providing 
guidance and encouragement. The activities are monitored and reviewed on a regular basis to 
ensure timely and quality completion.  
Part of the rationale for Metta’s support for community empowerment is the recognition 
that communities have their own vision for the future and understand what resources they have 
access to, and what further support they require. Any initiative that affects their lives and futures 
will have a lasting and positive impact only if the community members themselves are involved 
and invested in the decision-making process. Therefore, Metta has initiated and facilitated 
various CSO strengthening initiatives since its establishment. Vibrant local CSOs can more 
effectively champion local interests than proxy representatives who may not be fully aware of 
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the local context and appropriateness of interventions. In the past decade, Metta has designed and 
implemented a number of ambitious CSO strengthening projects across its project areas. It has 
also acted as a fund facilitator – helping channel funding to local CSOs which would not 
otherwise be able to access international donor funding for their operations and initiatives. The 
relationships established through these initiatives formed the foundations of the advocacy 
partnerships that Metta has utilized for RtF.  
Metta’s latest strategic plan explicitly included advocacy as an area of programming 
focus. This shift recognized the need for Metta to move beyond service delivery to helping 
communities engage directly and constructively with policymakers. This was paired with 
research, whereby Metta improves its learning systems to better document its experiences and 
systematically approaches community-based PAR research initiatives. The research efforts 
generate the knowledge and evidence base that can be leveraged for Metta and its community 
partners’ engagement with policy-makers. With this new focus on engaging in policy advocacy, 
RtF is Metta’s first, stand-alone, pioneering policy advocacy project.  
Metta project partners 
To accomplish the RtF project objectives, Metta convened three networks of advocacy 
alliances in the three project areas. Metta and Oxfam envisioned that these networks would 
eventually link up with each other and with other national level advocacy networks to coordinate 
and cooperate on advocacy initiatives that focus on the program’s food sovereignty themes, i.e. 
land, forestry, and seeds. The fourth project theme, private investment, was not a focus of 
Metta’s policy advocacy actions, as Metta and its project partner Oxfam agreed that strategically, 
Oxfam was better placed to address the related policy issues. This is due in part to comparative 
experiences and strengths of Metta and Oxfam respectively. Metta is better positioned to work 
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with its local CSO partners to advocate with stakeholders on land, forestry, and seeds issues. On 
the other hand, Oxfam has decades of experience engaging with the private sector on social 
justice issues. Especially given that RtF was Metta’s first pure advocacy project, it did not want 
to stretch its resources to take on a new portfolio of engaging with both state and private sector 
actors.  
The local alliances are composed solely of locally-based CSOs in each of the three 
project areas. These CSOs are locally active and share common objectives and common values 
with Metta: promoting community interests and sustainable community development initiatives, 
particularly in the agricultural sector and in the three RtF thematic policy areas that RtF. The 
CSOs include faith-based organizations (FBOs) and local development CSOs, all of which are in 
engaged in implementing a variety of community development and/or empowerment initiatives 
including awareness-raising, community mobilization, direct interventions focusing on 
sustainable livelihoods (e.g. agriculture/livelihood projects), as well as some policy advocacy, 
vis-à-vis community mobilization, research and data collection, and engagement with local 
authorities. Most of the partner CSOs are volunteer-based organizations, smaller in scale than 
Metta. Two of the partner organizations are FBOs, one operating in northern Shan state and one 
operating in Kachin state. One partner CSO from Kachin state is an environmental-focused local 
NGO, with its headquarters in Yangon. While these partner CSOs form an alliance with Metta to 
engage in policy advocacy, some of them are themselves network/alliance organizations 
composed of different organizations banding together to create a secretariat to pursue policy 
advocacy interests, particularly one partner in Kachin state. A common feature of all partner 
CSOs is that their core constituencies are rural communities in the geographical areas they are 
based, often defined along ethnic, faith, or livelihoods lines. The majority of the participating 
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CSOs have partnered with Metta in the past, and have received support directly or indirectly 
from Metta for their organizational development and project implementation. This was a refrain 
that emerged repeatedly in the interviews with the project partners when asked why they decided 
to participate in RtF. Seng Bu, a representative of one partner organization in Kachin state, 
essentially described the partnership with Metta and other RtF partners as symbiotic, saying 
“what my organization cannot provide, another can do so” (personal interview, February 8, 
2019). 
At the same time, the nature of the alliances itself is rather fluid. Due to the complex 
nature of Metta’s relationship with a large number of the organizations, it was difficult for the 
Metta program staff to definitively state that x number of organizations were part of the program 
initiatives. Rather, when questioned, they provided an approximation of the partner organizations 
and noted that the partners came and went as needed according to the nature of the advocacy 
action on an ad hoc basis. In some cases, there was no formal partnership per se, but rather 
partners worked together on specific activities or as the need arose. On average, however, there 
are seven partner organizations that work together on a regular basis with Metta on RtF program 
initiatives in northern Shan, seven in Kachin, and twelve in southern Shan. In some cases, the 
partners indicated that they found the partnership with Metta convenient because it provided 
them with access to funding that is more flexible than they might have otherwise had access to 
(Ja Nang, personal communication, February 6, 2019).  
Right to Food advocacy partnership 
The various CSOs, as much as they focus on community-based or 
environment/agriculture-based themes, are not all natural bedfellows. It has fallen on Metta, as 
the convener of the alliances, to cultivate relationships to ensure that a successful and fruitful 
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working relationship ensues. In fact, Thura, one senior program staff, noted that much of the first 
project year was spent building trust and mutual understanding between Metta and the partners, 
as well as among the partners themselves (personal communication, December 20, 2018). He 
further notes that Metta has had to overcome mistrust and reluctance to engage by local CSO 
actors due to Metta’s organizational size, ways of working, and perceived biases (to the 
establishment, to various ethnic/faith groups). Kaung, the director of a partner CSO in northern 
Shan, described the relationship between Metta and his organization as that between an elephant 
and a mouse, inferring that Metta has organizational capacity and perspective that is significantly 
greater and wider than his organization’s – a fact he suggested could then lead to differences in 
aims and objectives (personal communication, February 6, 2019). At the same time, the partners 
all appreciated Metta’s role and involvement in the alliance because Metta had the capacity, 
resources, and reach that no individual member necessarily had (Aung & Maung, personal 
communication, February 13, 2019; Naw Awng, personal communication, February 8, 2019; Roi 
Ja & Naw Din, personal communication, February 6, 2019). Aung and Maung, leaders of a 
southern Shan CSO partner, expressed their appreciation that despite Metta’s “seniority,” the 
CSOs were given due respect for their own capacity, as well as autonomy, the opportunity to 
assume leadership roles, and the resources needed to lead certain advocacy initiatives.  
While the RtF project is bound by the objectives laid out in the project proposal (see 
Introduction, p. 5), the vision of the RtF advocacy alliance Metta formed is not so formally 
verbalized. The Metta project staff broke down their understanding of the project objectives as 
“strengthening access to food-related rights, e.g., land, seed, natural resources, for farmers and 
ethnic groups” – so as to guarantee “people’s control over land, natural resources, and seeds” and 
“to enable communities to design and pursue their own visions of the future” (personal 
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communication, January 23, 2019) Conversations with CSO partners repeated these themes – 
community empowerment, creating opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, and addressing 
inequities experienced by ethnic groups and rural communities in accessing their rights (vis-à-vis 
land ownership, access to quality seed, access to and control of local forest lands and resources, 
etc.). To this end, the partners undertook various initiatives that included awareness-raising, 
community mobilization, research on policy issues of local concern, and engaging with the 
Myanmar government and parliamentarians at local, state, and national levels.  
In terms of the alliance’s leadership and decision-making mechanisms, there are no 
formally established ways of working. However, Metta is recognized to be the senior actor, 
given its organizational size and experience, and because of its role as the alliance convener and 
contract-holder of the project (Naw Awng, personal communication, February 8, 2019; Seng Bu, 
personal communication, February 8, 2019; Roi Ja & Naw Din, personal communication, 
February 6, 2019; Nang, personal communication, February 6, 2019). At the same time, Metta is 
cognizant that it is working together with other organizations towards achieving a mutual vision. 
Therefore, periodic coordination meetings are conducted to agree on a plan of action and Metta’s 
field staff supports and coordinates the implementation of activities in conjunction with staff 
from partner CSOs at the local level. However, this is not to say that Metta takes the leading role, 
as its preferred role and approach is to stay out of the limelight and rather nurture the capacity of 
local communities and CSOs to boldly engage with the authorities (focus group discussion, 
January 23, 2019).  
Parallel advocacy actors 
Understandably, Metta and its RtF partners are not the sole advocacy actors working to 
promote rural communities’ access to food rights. There are several national NGOs, as well as 
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international NGOs (INGOs) and working groups which have been funded by INGOs/donor 
organizations, which are also engaging in policy issues on the same themes. Metta has close ties 
with most of these organizations. As a result, these organizations often participate in and/or 
support one another’s national level advocacy events (and local ones when appropriate). 
However, at times, these organizations are at odds with the RtF consortium and with each other 
because of differing strategies and approaches.  
Policy 
 According to Unsicker (2014), policy is defining the parameters and causes of the public 
problem that the advocates plan to address. It also identifies a solution to the problem. This 
section will discuss the issues the RtF project seeks to solve and the policy solutions proposed by 
the CSO actors.  
Policy problem 
At the heart of the policy issues the RtF initiative seeks to address is the 
disenfranchisement that rural, agricultural communities, particularly in the ethnic-majority areas, 
are experiencing with respect to their food security and livelihoods. In other words, the project 
seeks to restore these rural communities’ food sovereignty, so that they are fully entitled to make 
their own decisions about what food they consume and what and how the food they consume is 
produced. Accordingly, the issues to be specifically addressed are – access to productive assets, 
i.e., land and seeds, and the communities’ right to decide what and how to cultivate.  
As Myanmar transitions from an authoritarian regime, led by the military, to a quasi-
civilian-led governance model, the government is under intense pressure to accelerate rural 
development (to alleviate poverty) and to bring about peace and stability to the country. This 
pressure has led the government to focus on economic policies that aim to foster economic 
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growth, particularly through creating a welcoming environment for foreign/private investment. 
However, these policies are being formulated and implemented without fully consulting and 
incorporating the voice of the communities they impact. They also do not address socio-
economic inequalities experienced by the affected communities. The dispossession and 
disenfranchisement are especially egregious in the ethnic-majority areas in which the RtF project 
operates – Kachin, northern and southern Shan states.  
The problems that the ethnic communities in the upland regions (as opposed to the 
flatland agricultural areas in the southern part of the country) have historic roots. Access to land 
and forests and quality seeds, which are all productive assets for farming households, have been 
curtailed by laws and policies enacted by successive government administrations since 
Myanmar’s independence. The upland, ethnic communities in Kachin and Shan states have 
historically observed customary land tenure practices, which emphasizing communal 
management, shifting cultivation, and relying on surrounding forests to sustainably harvest 
firewood and non-timber forest products for household needs. The Socialist government, which 
ran the country from 1962 to 1988 enacted laws that sought to homogenize land management 
practices and disregard the customary tenure practices in the upland regions. These placed 
onerous burdens on the ethnic peasantry to achieve land security. They often had to navigate a 
confusing maze of government bureaucracy, overcome potential language barriers (as the official 
working language is Burmese), and invest time and money to obtain official approval to continue 
cultivating their land. Classification of land types has also resulted in further alienation of upland 
communities from their lands. Upland farmers commonly practice shifting cultivation, often 
letting various portions of their land lie fallow for a number of seasons immediately following a 
harvest. This practice has opened up the door for the government to classify these lands as vacant 
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or fallow, subsequently leaving it open for confiscation by the state or land grabbing by private 
investors. There has also been land confiscated from ethnic populations who were forcibly 
evicted by the military for “security reasons” due to ongoing armed conflict in their areas. These 
confiscated lands were never returned or compensated for, instead being utilized by military 
personnel for their personal profit or for their cronies.  
In the 1960s, the Socialist government also enacted and enforced agricultural policies 
aimed towards increasing rice production, but this had the effect of further burdening farmers. To 
meet production quotas, farmers were pressured to cultivate their land every season, and had to 
navigate price controls imposed by the government. For the majority of farmers, who are 
smallholder farmers who cultivate less than ten acres of land, this became a burden and led to the 
deterioration of their farmland, as they could not utilize practices such as crop rotation and 
leaving fields to lie fallow to recover between seasons, it also required them to invest in farm 
inputs, e.g., fertilizers and pesticides. Myanmar’s self-imposed isolation from the international 
community after 1962, also generated knock-on effects on the agriculture sector. Access to 
modern technology was extremely limited and lack of capacity to innovate internally meant that 
farming in Myanmar remained labor intensive. Access to quality seeds became difficult as 
government service provision lagged. The government’s agriculture extension services were 
stretched to the limit and did not have sufficient facilities to produce quality seeds. 
When SLORC assumed power in 1990, it started opening Myanmar’s doors to the global 
economy. Foreign investment was welcomed and accommodations to entice foreign investors 
were made. Laws and policies that would be favorable were drafted and adopted. The transition 
of Myanmar’s economy to a market economy exacerbated challenges already faced by the 
peasantry. Chief among these challenges was an uptick in land confiscation in the name of 
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national progress – particularly in ethnic areas with access to natural resources. Communal land, 
often forests, that had been cultivated for years was converted to industrial plantations (e.g. 
rubber and banana). The drive to grow the economy meant that there was increased pressure to 
cultivate export-friendly agriculture crops as well. At the same time, a lack of proper trade 
policies or regulations exposed farmers to risks dictated by the market and weather conditions 
(Tun, personal communication, January 16, 2019). There were (and are) no proper credit 
facilities to enable farmers to be able to absorb these risks.  
Greatly influenced by the international donor community and development paradigms 
from the Global North, succeeding government administrations have continued to embrace 
market economy-oriented policies. Features of such policies include export-oriented agriculture, 
acceleration of natural resource extraction by private domestic and international investors, as 
well as developing Myanmar’s industrial/manufacturing sector. This has led to declining access 
to land, forest, water, and productive resources for local farmers (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015).  In 
addition, extractive industries and agribusiness are leaving local communities increasingly 
vulnerable due to deteriorating environmental conditions, lack of livelihood options, and 
subsequent associated negative social impacts. Local communities and local authorities are often 
not equipped to hold these private investment ventures accountable, as they do not have the 
relevant knowledge. Moreover, Myo, a local non-Metta-affiliated consultant who is conversant 
in the Myanmar government’s political processes and economic policies, observed that the 
existing legal framework does not have the capacity to address these challenges (personal 
communication, January 26, 2019); he notes that there are over 60 existing land-related laws, 
which makes it challenging for any stakeholder to hold anyone accountable or find a workable 
solution to existing problems.   
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Proposed policy solution  
 The RtF initiative addresses a broad range of issues under the food sovereignty umbrella. 
Jim, Metta’s project counterpart from Oxfam in Myanmar, noted that from the outset, the project 
“had a basket of thematic areas which it could choose from” (personal communication, March 
14, 2019). Moreover, each thematic area itself is individually wide-ranging. However, 
conversations with project staff and partners indicate that the RtF partners embraced a set of 
basic principles that signal the nature of policy solutions they are seeking. These are also the 
underlying values of the advocates. The principles are: people-centered laws and policies; an 
ecological approach in the utilization of natural and productive resources; and ensuring good 
governance.  
The advocates’ focus is very much on promoting the voice and interests of ethnic rural 
communities, who face multiple disadvantages. These disadvantages have long been 
insurmountable for these communities, including lack of knowledge and awareness about 
relevant laws, policies and administrative processes, exclusion/lack of 
representation/consultation in policy-making processes, lack of choice with respect to pursuing 
stable, sustainable livelihoods, and vulnerability to instability in areas where they live due to 
armed conflict (which has led to them being uprooted or vulnerable to exploitation by the 
military and/or ethnic armed groups). The baseline study for the project (2015) also indicates that 
communities in Kachin, northern and southern Shan states, where the project is being 
implemented, have low levels of trust in the authorities and that politics (and related matters) are 
sensitive (in other words considered risky and unapproachable).  
Therefore, the advocates are conscious that any policy solution that is proposed and 
adopted must incorporate the abovementioned principles. This then means that the process of 
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formulating any laws or policies that affect these rural communities must include consultation 
with community representatives and incorporation/reflection of their inputs. Elected officials and 
government officials from relevant departments must also be responsive to address communities’ 
concerns and questions. The administrative processes that these rural residents must navigate in 
order to safeguard their livelihood assets also need to be streamlined and/or made more 
accessible and transparent. Finally, the pursuit of national social advancement and economic 
development should not displace traditional ecological approaches, which have long preserved 
ethnic communities’ natural resources. Doing so discounts communities’ collective wisdom and 
voice and excludes realistic and sustainable measures.  
The RtF partners developed these principles partly because they themselves are part of 
these communities. Their lived experience is their primary source of information and guides their 
policy advocacy direction. Further, they have been partnering with technical experts to analyze 
the impact of the existing and/or proposed legislation and policies on communities and identify 
gaps between theory and practice. In doing such analysis, it became evident that there was a 
distinct lack of community voice in the laws and policies concerning land and forestry, seeds, 
and private investment. They also work with communities to facilitate PAR studies on these 
issues to highlight and produce case studies to present to duty-bearers. 
Policy makers are sympathetic to the policy stance taken by the RtF advocates to an 
extent. Recognizing that these are representatives of civil society, with strong ties to ethnic rural 
communities and peasantry, who ultimately are their constituents that they must hold themselves 
accountable to, they have made at least superficial efforts to invite and include them in policy 
discussions. At the same time, the policy priorities they espouse are shaped by development 
paradigms that are in turn deeply influenced by donors and pro-market interests. They place a 
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heavier emphasis on developing Myanmar as a market economy, shaped alongside existing 
global economies, i.e., growing Myanmar’s economy by orienting agriculture production for 
export markets, developing the industrial sector, and opening up the economy to private 
investors. For private economic actors – profit maximization is the key principle. Policy makers 
subsequently rely on hard data, expert opinions provided by technical experts/technocrats, and in 
doing so, the voice of the community is often subsumed.   
Critique 
 In considering the policy position of the RtF partnership, it is evident that the focus is on 
raising the voice of ethnic rural constituents. The RtF partners have deliberately adopted the 
abovementioned principles for this large portfolio of policy issues, which they have grouped 
under the food sovereignty umbrella, that will move forward their agenda. Considering 
Myanmar’s policy context, and the nature of the project, it is a sensible approach. The principles 
take on board the needs and interests of the constituents who are being directly affected. If the 
RtF partnership continues on the same trajectory, the initiative may well be positioned to 
contribute towards bringing about greater social justice in communities which have not 
previously had access to their rights and services. This links back to the initial concepts raised 
when I first considered this case study. However, as long as structural issues are not concretely 
addressed, which may well be beyond the scope of the RtF initiative, the impact it can have on 
achieving greater social justice for Myanmar society as a whole will be minimal. 
Politics 
Politics is defining who the actors are within the advocacy context, specifically 
identifying who the decision makers are, as well as who are potential allies and opponents. In the 
section below, I will discuss who the political actors that affect the RtF advocacy efforts are. 
GRASSROOTS-INITIATED POLICY ADVOCACY IN A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY 49 
This is primarily based on the stakeholder analysis that Metta staff have conducted (Oxfam in 
Myanmar, 2015).  
Target institutions 
The primary target institutions are actors within Myanmar’s legislative and executive 
branches.  
The legislative branch consists of the two houses of Parliament, known as the Pyithu 
Hluttaw (House of Representatives or the Lower House) and the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of 
Nationalities or the Upper House). Within these two Hluttaws, the RtF advocates aim to engage 
with not just the elected representatives, but the committees which are debating, formulating and 
legislating issues that RtF covers. When the need arises, RtF also endeavors to engage with state 
level Hluttaws as well (Thura, personal communication, December 19, 2018; Naw Awng, 
personal communication, February 8, 2019).  
Within the executive branch, specific targets are: the President’s Office, the relevant line 
ministries (MOALI; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation 
[MONREC]), as well as issue-related, inter-governmental/ministerial committees such as the 
Farmland Management Body, Central Committee for the Management of Vacant, Fallow, and 
Virgin Land, Land Allocation and Utilization Committees, Department for Rural Development, 
etc. State, district, and township level government departments in the project areas (Kachin, 
northern and southern Shan), along with any autonomous governing bodies, such as the PaOh 
self-administration in southern Shan are also approached as needed (Roi Ja & Naw Din, personal 
communication, February 6, 2019).  
The decision-making processes of the abovementioned institutions are very hierarchical, 
top-down oriented. There is traditionally limited (almost non-existent) external consultation with 
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community stakeholders. In the present NLD administration, the policy direction is indicated by 
the NLD leadership, which is generally understood to be Aung San Suu Kyi and, to an extent, the 
NLD Central Executive Committee. The Members of Parliament (MPs) have limited freedom in 
proposing or debating legislation in opposition to priorities set by the leadership. Anecdotes from 
colleagues involved in engagement with MPs, as well as news articles in local news publications, 
indicate that any “rebellion” or actions seen to be counter to the official party line lead to the MP 
in question being censured/pressured. RtF partners noted that a sympathetic MP who had raised a 
question related to land-grabbing issues in a parliamentary session, based on information he had 
received from the RtF partnership, later faced severe pressure and censure from his party 
leadership as he had spoken up without official sanction (Thura, personal communication, 
December 19, 2018; Aung & Maung, personal communication, February 13, 2019).  
The policy planning process within the government departments is also hierarchical. 
These processes are not very transparent. A senior official from MOALI indicated that policy is 
set by the leadership within the executive branch, with government department officials 
providing technical advice (Khine, personal communication, March 5, 2019). At the same time, 
there are indications that there is some movement towards citizen consultation in the legislative 
processes in certain issues. During the lead-up to the adoption of the National Land Use Policy in 
2016, citizen consultative processes were facilitated across the country by national CSOs on the 
invitation of MOALI (Tun, personal communication, January 16, 2019). This was a first in 
Myanmar’s legislative history. While the resulting document was hailed as being progressive, 
implementation on the ground is still slow. New legislation, particularly the Vacant, Fallow, 
Virgin law that is newly enacted in late 2018, could offset any gains (Hirsh, 2018). 
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Further, as previously noted, there are unwritten rules and policies within government 
departments and the political parties that external actors are not privy to (Myo, personal 
communication, January 26, 2019). These unwritten norms block or inhibit any policy change 
initiatives championed by non-governmental actors.  
Allies 
There is a broad range of actors who can be considered to be allies to the RtF initiative.  
The first group of actors are rooted in Myanmar civil society. As briefly discussed in the 
advocates section, there are a number of CSOs not directly involved with the RtF project 
directly, but whose policy interests run in parallel. These include national and international 
NGOs who focus on rural development initiatives. They too are interested in promoting 
initiatives and policies that promote equity and equality for rural residents. At the same time, 
they may not be natural bedfellows with RtF or Metta because their underlying approach to 
engaging with decisionmakers is different, i.e., they may adopt more confrontational approaches 
as opposed to the non-confrontational approaches that underpin much of Metta’s interactions 
with state actors. Faith-based organizations, Buddhist and Christian in particular, have a lot of 
influence within their communities and may be undertaking rural development initiatives of their 
own. Due to their ties to RtF advocates’ constituencies, they are also allies of the policy 
advocacy efforts. Farmer organizations have re-emerged as an active bloc since the democratic 
transition began, particularly working on land issues, and Metta and RtF partners have linked up 
with such organizations to facilitate state and national events on a regular basis.  
Political parties, particularly ethnic political parties in the project areas, are also allies 
because they strongly recognize that they must be banner-bearers for the communities they want 
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to represent at state and national level fora. However, they too may face constraints as described 
above for NLD MPs.  
A final group of potential allies are multilateral and bilateral (aid) agencies, as well as 
diplomatic missions. These include the World Bank Group, United Nations agencies, the Asian 
Development Bank, diplomatic missions from the US, UK, EU, and Scandinavia. On the one 
hand, they are interested in fostering Myanmar’s development, but are also cognizant of the 
international standards and norms that must be observed. Given that they are a major source of 
funding (and investment) for Myanmar at this time, any pressure brought to bear by any of these 
actors will be taken seriously.  
Opponents 
 When considering the actors who are in opposition to the RtF advocates or have interests 
counter to the RtF policy stance, two blocs of stakeholders immediately stand out. The first bloc 
is the military. The second bloc consists of private companies, which include Myanmar and 
foreign companies. 
 The military has long been associated with using their power and military strength to 
exploit local communities for their own benefit, though they may couch it as taking measures to 
protect the citizenry and stability of the state. Whenever military units establish their presence in 
an area, communal land and/or privately-owned land from the local community and residents is 
often confiscated for their use. Even after the military presence is withdrawn, this confiscated 
land usually finds its way into the hands of soldiers/officers. This land is not returned. The 
military, especially through their connections to crony companies, notably the Myanmar 
Economic Holdings, Ltd., and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, have stakes in mining and a 
variety of other Myanmar agribusinesses. Therefore, it is in the military’s interest to preserve the 
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status quo, or to support the development and adoption of pro-investment laws, as this will make 
it easier for their business interests to continue flourishing. Although such blatant opportunism 
has ceased for the most part nowadays, the legacy of their past actions continues to reverberate 
negatively with respect to the food sovereignty of the ethnic rural communities.  
 Foreign companies, particularly those from China, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia, 
which are investing in agribusiness and natural resource extraction are the second bloc of actors 
which may be in opposition to RtF advocates. Ultimately, RtF policy advocacy measures 
threaten their bottom line. For those interested in investing in natural resource extractive 
industries, such as mining or timber, and in agribusinesses, such as rubber and banana 
plantations, they stand to face more restrictions/tighter enforcement of environmental and social 
impact measures. Their access to land on which these kinds of activities can be carried out will 
also become more difficult and burdensome. Companies, such as CP Company from Thailand, 
that specialize in agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, would also face 
greater resistance from communities and stricter standards, as existing ones are lax. Regulations 
around contract farming arrangements could also become more stringent, given that many 
farmers are being taken advantage of currently.  
 When considering foreign commercial interests, the geopolitics and economic interests of 
China in Myanmar has emerged as an important opponent for civil society actors advocating on 
behalf of rural communities. Through its ‘One Belt, One Road’ (or ‘Belt and Road’) initiative, as 
well as previous large infrastructure investment projects, e.g., hydropower dam construction at 
the confluence of the Ayeyarwady River, China has become an influential factor in the 
development of Myanmar’s economic development policies. Chinese investors focus primarily 
on the bottom line, while paying convenient lip service to corporate social accountability. In 
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addition, the Chinese companies have anecdotally proven to be hostile to citizen/community 
activists who seek to protect existing local natural resources/assets.  
 Ethnic armed groups could also be in opposition to efforts of the Rtf initiative. In the 
areas that they control, these actors often engage in rent-seeking behavior, as well as generate 
income for their armed forces through natural resource extraction, often accessed through land 
confiscation themselves. Inasmuch as they purport to be engaging in armed struggle on behalf of 
their respective ethnic groups, they tend to be resistant to progressive social policies.  
Strategy 
The RtF partnership’s plan of action to engage with policy-makers and influential actors 
is described in the following sub-sections.  
Objectives 
The Right to Food advocacy strategy is guided by the proposed impact statement given in 
the project proposal: “Smallholder farmers, landless, and forest-dwelling women and men in 90 
villages in Kachin, Northern, and Southern Shan provinces in Myanmar realize their right to food 
sovereignty…” (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015, p. 12). To this end, the long-term objective of the 
RtF initiative envisions these rural residents working alongside civil society alliances to 
“influence government and private sector to adopt and implement fairer and more responsible 
laws and policies in land, forest, seed, and private investment, therefore ensuring their access and 
rights to these resources in line with best practice international standards (e.g. FPIC, EIA/SIA, 
UNGP)” (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015, p. 12). The intermediate outcomes will see civil society’s 
capacities enhanced, private sector actors sensitized to the relevant policy themes, and 
influencing governmental actors to change and implement improved legal and policy 
frameworks that would effectively serve the interests of the RtF constituency.  
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Advocacy approach 
 The messages that the RtF advocates convey to their targets are shaped by the principles 
discussed in the policy section above. They are given further coherency and shape by 
incorporating the communities’ needs and priorities and community-based research conducted by 
the RtF partners and the communities themselves. Any public message that is communicated to 
stakeholders external to the project partnership is first developed by the RtF advocates based on 
available information and research and agreed on by everyone involved before being 
disseminated.  
 The Rtf advocates’ basic constituency consists of the rural, agriculture-based 
communities of Kachin and northern and southern Shan states, as the initiative seeks to ensure 
that these communities are able to access their food-related rights. These communities are 
identified and mobilized by the different RtF partners, based on their existing ties. As the RtF 
CSO partners are locally based to begin with, they already have pre-existing ties to communities 
in areas where they work. With assistance from the project, staff from these partner organizations 
undertake a range of awareness-raising activities at community level. This is the first step to 
sensitize the communities themselves of their rights and to create opportunities for community 
members to voice their needs and to identify the solutions they would prefer (so as to present to 
policymakers). This then helps to solidify the constituency base for the advocacy efforts. Of all 
the partner organizations, Metta has the greatest presence and most experience of working with 
communities. Metta also has the established reputation of being a credible organization and 
relationships with relevant government departments – facilitating initial contact with duty 
bearers and raising sensitive topics.    
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For the most part, community mobilization begins with facilitating awareness-raising 
sessions in communities on topics of concern (particularly land tenure rights, agriculture know-
how, community forestry). This is then followed by PAR-related activities which include 
assisting the community to curate local knowledge and wisdom (which then forms a basis for 
evidence-based advocacy) and organizing community-based committees (which are the building 
blocks for the emergence of CSOs in the future). The project further supports capacity building 
of the community advocates by organizing exchange and exposure visits within and across each 
project area, so that the farmers can learn and expand their knowledge base and build up 
relationships for future advocacy efforts. In addition, the RtF project provides financial support 
needed to make possible the participating communities’ engagement with relevant duty-bearers, 
e.g., travel expenses, recruiting technical experts, expenses for documentation. Subsequent 
activities are usually identified primarily at the community-level by the communities themselves. 
Examples of these activities include: 
• successful mobilization of local farmers to petition the government for the return of 
confiscated land to rightful owners in four villages of Kachin state, after most of the 
farmers had received thorough training in existing Farmland Law and farmers’ rights and 
entitlements (Metta, 2018); 
• a successful petition, submitted to the Amyotha Hluttaw, to protect a local water source 
by six villages in southern Shan state (Metta, 2018);  
• formation of the Northern Shan Land and Environment Network in northern Shan state 
(Metta, 2018); and   
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• a signature campaign, spearheaded by local CSOs in partnership with farmer unions in 
northern Shan state, protesting the existing 2012 land laws and the 2017 land confiscation 
act (Metta, 2018).  
 The thematic sweep of the RtF policy advocacy initiative requires the partnership to 
engage in broad-based alliance-building and networking. Metta, as the project lead, is cognizant 
of this and has invested much of its attention to this end. As Thura noted earlier in discussing the 
RtF advocates and project partners, Metta staff spent much of the first project year cultivating 
relationships among project partners, but also relationships with other CSO actors working on 
the same policy themes. The partnership ensured that they would participate in other 
alliances/networks’ public events and meetings and campaigns, often from behind the scenes. 
Metta project staff shared in focus group discussions, and captured in the project’s outcome case 
studies, that the RtF participants (CSO staff and community members) have participated in state 
level and national level events that have been organized by affiliated organizations/networks, 
such as farmer forums and policy debates.  
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In general, in advocacy initiatives around the world, media engagement has often been 
key in mobilizing public support for the policy advocacy efforts. RtF has invited members of the 
press to public events it has convened, but often the interest by editorial boards is low and 
subsequent coverage has been low-key. It is also because print media does not penetrate to the 
community level as much as it does in urban areas, so it has not been a key cornerstone of the 
RtF advocacy strategy as such. Social media, particularly Facebook, is a key venue for 
information dissemination in Myanmar nowadays, as it is in much of the world. Therefore, RtF 
partners in each of the geographical areas have found ways to organize on social media to share 
and disseminate information – for instance using Facebook pages in southern Shan or Viber 
messaging in northern Shan (focus group discussion, February 13, 2019). The project has also 
worked with partners to develop appropriate IEC (information, education, communication) 
Figure 3 An informational pamphlet on the 2018 Virgin, Fallow, and Vacant Land Law developed for 
dissemination in northern Shan state 
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materials, such as posters, pamphlets, presentations (Kaung, February 6, 2019). A partner in 
southern Shan also publishes quarterly magazines, containing articles about the environment and 
locally relevant issues, with support from the project (Aung & Maung, February 13, 2019).  
  
 In order to influence the RtF target institutions, the partnership has largely been guided 
by Metta’s underlying philosophy of “non-confrontational” engagement with duty-bearers. This 
is a soft diplomatic approach, where common ground is established in order to start a 
conversation that can be steered towards what the partnership would like to achieve. While this 
has been stifling for some partners, this stance has been respected, especially as there are other 
advocacy actors who take a more confrontational approach and the partners are not locked into 
working solely with Metta and RtF. Specific tactics that have been utilized by Metta include 
Figure 4 Cover of a quarterly publication published by an RtF partner in southern Shan state 
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preparing policy briefings using evidence generated by PAR studies at community level, where 
the community members themselves are able to describe the impact that current legislation and 
policies have on their livelihoods/rights and recommend direction for future action. The RtF 
initiative has also facilitated public events where communities and local CSOs can engage with 
national, state, and local government officials to discuss their challenges and identify solutions. 
These have been well-received by all concerned – community members because it removes the 
power distance, and by government officials because it creates a neutral ground where they can 
be somewhat more informal and engage more freely with the citizenry (focus group discussion, 
January 23, 2019). A lot of my conversations with government officials in the course of my work 
and in the course of my research indicate that government officials are eager to engage with 
communities but are, for a number of reasons, constrained in doing so and therefore these sorts 
of events facilitated by “trusted” CSOs are opportune. RtF has also facilitated opportunities for 
CSO partners and community representatives to participate in other policy advocacy debates and 
discussions spearheaded by other organizations, particularly by providing funding support for 
travel expenses, because they would not otherwise have been able to represent their 
constituencies in these important conversations. The partnership has also undertaken signature 
collection campaigns to pressure the state governments to take action against land confiscation 
and bad environmental practices. However, although communities were successfully mobilized, 
this was a massive undertaking. Communities are distrustful of any negative blowback, 
justifiably, from the government (and the military). At state level, RtF has also indirectly 
supported local communities in taking legal action against private sector companies, which has 
seen some success. Moreover, RtF has tried to engage with lawmakers, particularly at the Union 
level. However, they have had limited success on this front. While MPs may individually be 
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sympathetic, given that they have to toe the party line, they cannot publicly endorse a lot of what 
the RtF initiative stands for. There was one notable success that Thura and RtF partners related 
to me in the course of my interviews – a Union level parliamentarian raised questions during a 
parliamentary session with regards to the government’s proposed legislation on land and private 
investment. Afterwards, he informed the RtF partners that he faced a lot of pressure and criticism 
from the party leadership for having done so.  
Critique 
 It has been difficult to properly analyze the RtF advocacy strategy because of its broad-
reaching objectives. However, its approach in building alliances to push the advocacy agenda 
forward is effective in some ways. Having broad community-based support strengthens the 
messages conveyed by the RtF alliance. The community-led research is also effective, not just as 
capacity building, but also in shaping the messages into ones that legislators and policy-makers 
must pay attention to as these are also their constituents whom they cannot afford to ignore. 
Raising awareness at community level through utilization of IEC materials is a smart approach 
because it enables the RtF messaging to have a broader reach than its initial outreach 
communities and partners. Supporting communities’ efforts to take legal action is also sensible 
as it empowers these communities who might otherwise have remained powerless.  
At the same time, the strategy focus that needs to be strengthened is in working with 
more legislators. During the interviews, RtF partners repeatedly identified lawmakers and 
government departments as advocacy targets. Few further details were offered beyond a vague 
description, e.g., “Hluttaw representatives.” The RtF advocates need to be able to identify their 
policy targets specifically, as well as understanding the circumstances in which allies can 
become blockers and vice versa. When questioned about who the allies and blockers were for the 
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RtF partnership, most RtF advocates identified allies within government and claimed that there 
were no blockers. While this may be true for their current circumstances, the partnership needs to 
be prepared for the situation to change and identify ways to adapt their advocacy approach.  
Finally, the advocates need to consider how to engage more constructively with duty-
bearers and develop a more specific plan of action rather than being reactive to the current 
political climate. There is no doubt that the advocates have an advocacy plan that is largely 
informed by community needs and priorities. They are also able to leverage connections to 
further the RtF goals. However, the existing plans appear to be very general and at times ad hoc 
in nature. While accepting the need for advocacy plans to be flexible to adapt to quickly 
changing political circumstances, advocates also need to have detailed plans to assist with 
achieving their aims. Not having such details set out beforehand can prevent clear 
communication among partners and can potentially result in missed opportunities.   
Evaluation 
It has been somewhat of a challenge to properly evaluate the effectiveness and impact of 
the advocacy. This is due in part to the wide-ranging nature of the initiative itself – it does not 
focus on just one policy theme, but three. Secondly, it is project-bound; although the donor has 
been flexible in how the project team structures its strategies, there are certain deliverables to 
which the project-holder, Metta, is held accountable. These do not necessarily link in with 
traditional advocacy approaches, which are much more fluid and adaptative. The project itself 
was in its implementation period at the time the interviews were conducted, so the outcomes 
could not be fully determined. This section will discuss the effectiveness of the Right to Food 
initiative in Myanmar, especially in terms of its processes and outcomes. My analysis will be 
based on the advocacy circles framework. 
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Effectiveness 
 Metta and Oxfam developed a very ambitious project goal - that state and private actors 
are influenced so that rural communities will have access to their rights related to food and 
related productive resources (Oxfam in Myanmar, 2015).  Admittedly, this is the intervention’s 
long-term impact and not necessarily achievable during the duration of the project, especially 
given unforeseen external factors. The goals for the intermediate term appear more realistic and 
achievable within the five-year project period – capacitating civil society, sensitizing the private 
sector to communities’ concerns and rights, and influencing state actors to adopt and enforce 
legislation and policy measures for the benefit of the RtF constituency (Oxfam in Myanmar, 
2015). The community-based approach that is Metta’s modus operandi and its strong attention to 
nurturing alliances with CSOs at the local level in the project areas have contributed to the 
emergence of a more capable and more vocal civil society at the state level. The second objective 
was not so much the focus of Metta and its allies; in fact, early strategic discussions (in which I 
was involved as it was prior to my departure from Metta) with Oxfam, the primary project 
counterpart, concluded that Oxfam would be better placed and had more expertise to address this 
objective. The final objective has seen moderate gains. Relationships have been forged with local 
authorities towards the enforcement of existing land laws, while community voices and CSOs 
have been mobilized at local level and linked up with national efforts to engage with union 
policy-makers.   
Processes 
 The RtF alliance clearly understands the policy context in which they are operating and 
the analyses they have produced are reflective of that. Moreover, they were astute in identifying 
the key stakeholders they must influence to achieve their desired outcomes. However, they have 
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been constrained by unforeseen external factors that have limited their success. Of particular 
significance is that the NLD administration has hardened its attitude towards civil society and 
has not engaged constructively, but rather views CSOs with a lot of mistrust and wariness (Myo, 
personal communication, January 26, 2019; Jim, personal communication, March 14, 2019).  
 Metta and its partners strategically decided to focus the main thrust of their advocacy 
approach on community-based tactics and focus on changes at the local level. This is a sensible 
approach in cultivating the growth of a vibrant civil society. As discussed earlier, an active civil 
society is considered to be essential for a democratic society, and to hold government 
accountable, so as to promote good governance (He, 2012; Mosley, 2016). In an advocacy 
context like Myanmar, which is emerging from being ruled by an authoritarian regime for over 
six decades, it is essential that the citizenry learns what their rights are and how to hold duty-
bearers accountable. Therefore, what RtF has essentially been doing is assisting communities in 
finding their voice. The empowerment efforts include raising awareness about the rights they are 
entitled to, providing skills for community members to research and compile information about 
the challenges they are facing (which can then be used in their policy advocacy efforts), and 
creating platforms for them to engage meaningfully with those in positions of power. At the 
same time, their efforts may have been even more effective if they were able to leverage the 
nascent local-level movements into a larger, more active national movement. However, the 
initiative was limited in this respect because it takes time to raise the capacity and confidence 
levels of the community members, to raise their interest in becoming involved in such actions, 
and to assure them that their involvement would not put them further at risk. Perhaps the most 
significant limitation they faced is that these advocacy actions needed to be balanced with the 
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community members’ daily livelihood activities – their advocacy engagement could not take 
place at the cost of losing their limited incomes.  
 Another key feature of the initiative’s approach is the conscious building of local CSO 
alliances. While the initial project design had envisioned direct citizen engagement, Metta 
quickly came to realize that it would be more effective if local CSOs could be mobilized as well. 
CSOs essentially act as the bridge between civil society at large and the state; furthermore, 
professionalized CSOs (NGOs in other words) have become convenient funnels of assistance 
from donors (Ottaway, 2012). At the same time, they are also considered to be 
proxies/representatives for communities themselves. Metta and many of its CSO partners are 
deeply grounded in the communities where they work and thus position themselves as aforesaid 
proxies for their constituent communities. They are able to approach the communities easily and 
gain their trust. With funding from the project donor, they are able to engage in capacity building 
of communities and carry out research for the policy advocacy activities. As the project partners 
have access to different communities (geographical spread) and different sections of the 
communities (e.g., ethnic/religious backgrounds), not to mention different technical focus (i.e., 
some focus on development interventions, while others focus more on rights awareness), they are 
able to be much more comprehensive in coverage. However, alliance building takes time, as has 
been acknowledged by the Metta project staff. Where there were no prior relationships, 
particularly in southern Shan, Metta has had to devote a significant amount time to align ways of 
working and operational management practices (the latter for donor accountability), and 
overcome different perceptions to ensure a smooth working relationship. Beyond the alliance 
building, the decision-making process has had an impact on the speed of implementation of 
activities. The partnership’s decision-making process is horizontal, designed to respect each 
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participating organization’s voice. This often means that each partner must be consulted and 
brought on board, which in itself is a time-consuming process. This has at times limited and 
constrained the rapidity with which the initiative could react to new developments or initiate new 
activities. The diverse backgrounds that the partners hail from has also contributed to a learning 
curve for the partnership as a whole because some have a more activist bent, while some may be 
more conservative. Therefore, establishing mutual ground and a common agenda has been time-
consuming.  
 The participatory action research curated by the RtF alliance has also been valuable. On 
the one hand, it has built up the skills and confidence of the communities involved to articulate 
their concerns and opinions. More importantly, the resultant research has formed the evidence 
base for conversations with those in positions of power and other intermediaries who can 
influence target decisionmakers. Metta and Oxfam have disseminated this information to allies 
who are in a position to influence policymakers, e.g., diplomatic delegations, donor agencies, 
and media. Of interest is a research report that the alliance recently produced in Kachin state on 
banana plantations, which have widespread negative environmental impact but have not been 
regulated. This has been widely quoted and referenced in media reports and utilized by other 
advocacy actors.  
 The advocates have capitalized on opportunities that have opened up as a result of RtF, as 
have already been discussed. However, the reach of the initiative could have perhaps been 
greater and more successful if the public was more widely engaged. The lack of a defined 
advocacy plan of action has limited the effectiveness of outcomes, because they have not been 
able to offer up concrete policy recommendations. The slow mobilization of the alliance may 
potentially have caused it to miss out on the more receptive policy sphere – with the 2020 
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national elections approaching, lawmakers and the NLD may not be as interested in discussing 
food sovereignty issues. They will be interested in addressing issues of concern to a broader base 
of their electorate; in other words, they will focus on education, infrastructure development, jobs 
and livelihoods, health, issues in particular.    
Outcomes 
 As previously discussed, it is difficult to fully determine the effectiveness of the 
initiative’s outcomes at this point. However, examining the achievements in three key areas 
provides a partial insight into the progress Metta and its partners have made. 
 The ambitious policy changes have not yet been achieved. Engagements between citizen 
stakeholders and duty-bearers have laid the foundation for more favorable land, forestry, seeds 
and investment laws and policies in the future. This is to be expected as it is only three years 
since the policy advocacy efforts began. However, external developments, such as the ongoing 
uncertain national peace process, upcoming national elections in 2020, and pressure from private 
investors/lenders may derail these achievements if the momentum is not sustained.  
 In terms of governance, the advocates have made in-roads into holding duty-bearers, i.e., 
local authorities and government department officials, more accountable and responsive. My 
conversations with a government official from MOALI and a Yangon Regional MP have 
indicated that these actors welcome engagement with civil society actors. At the same time, they 
have internal, structural constraints that limit how responsive they can be. This indicates that 
advocacy efforts alone cannot achieve change but that the duty-bearers must also accompany 
legislative/policy changes with structural changes to fully ensure proper responsiveness.  
 The biggest impact the initiative has achieved is in terms of building capacity of civil 
society actors and the citizenry. The project partners’ efforts have seen the creation of more 
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space in the public sphere for CSO actors to participate in policy debates. The communities are 
also now more aware of their rights related to food sovereignty issues and possess more 
confidence to step up and speak out.  
Lessons Learned 
Based on the experiences of the Right to Food initiative and the research I have undertaken, I 
have identified the following lessons learned. These lessons may help guide future citizen-based 
advocacy initiatives, particularly ones spearheaded by CSOs, which are conducted in a politically 
sensitive context such as Myanmar.  
1. Relationship-building is a key factor for success. This refers to both relationship-
building between civil society actors and state actors (MPs, department officials), as well 
as among civil society actors themselves. This helps bridge the barrier between the 
different parties that may exist over misconceptions, philosophical stances, and policy 
priorities. The increased familiarity cultivates increased willingness on the part of 
policymakers to listen to and engage with civil society and vice versa, thus creating an 
enabling environment for genuine dialogue. Amidst having to navigate the complexities 
of departmental regulations, written and unwritten rules and norms within government 
departments and political parties, the social familiarity facilitates diverse actors to engage 
with each other while acknowledging and accepting their differences, yet committing to 
finding mutual ground to work together.  
Among civil society actors, getting to know each other better facilitates cooperation for 
advocacy action and knowledge exchange. This factor has in fact been acknowledged by 
RtF partners themselves in the interviews: when working together, different parties can 
complement each other through different skillsets/resources that each may possess and 
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make the initiatives at hand succeed even more (Seng Bu, personal communication, 
February 8, 2019).  
2. Alliances are also vital in policy advocacy. As evidenced from the RtF experience, 
alliance members can fill in gaps in knowledge and expertise others may lack. Alliances 
themselves may also adopt strategic approaches that will ultimately be complementary to 
each other. It should be noted, however, that alliance building takes time and does not 
necessarily form naturally. When building the alliance, all participating parties need to 
explicitly set objectives for the alliance and allocate roles and responsibilities. Such good 
governance practices are likely to facilitate communication and coordination. 
3. Advocates need a concrete plan of action, and to be proactive. While RtF had a vision 
for what it wanted to achieve, the weakness of the initiative laid in lacking concrete 
measures that it could recommend to policymakers. By allowing the community to 
dictate its advocacy agenda, the initiative could not necessarily set out a more specific 
agenda that may have been more precise and proactive. It was not able to strategically 
address certain policy issues, which may not have been identified directly by the 
community. This resulted in the alliance reacting to evolving policy developments.  
Advocacy objectives should also be concrete; RtF suffered from mission-spread, in that 
its ambition was to address three broad thematic areas. In doing so, the RtF partners were 
unable to concretely address and make gains in any of the target policy areas. Kaung, an 
RtF partner, even recommended that the partnership develop annual work plans (personal 
communication, February 6, 2019). Ideally, the RtF advocacy action plan should also 
have included detailed stakeholder analyses that are regularly updated and kept on file for 
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easy reference by all involved and setting out key messages from the outset; these 
analyses could have been enriched by information generated by communities themselves.  
4. Civil society must not shy away from engaging with state actors, even when their 
historical experience may have shown that government cannot be trusted. State/political 
actors may be constrained in how they can engage with other actors, but civil society 
actors are not as restrained. Tun (personal communication, January 16, 2019), a senior 
Metta staff member, had noted that the military contingent in parliament pays close 
attention to policy discussions at the Hluttaw level surrounding the RtF’s portfolio, but 
did not participate actively at the local level. Civil society actors also refuse in general to 
engage with USDP (Nyunt, personal communication, February 18, 2019). While this is 
understandable given Myanmar’s history and USDP’s roots, I would argue that leaving 
them out alienates them even more and provides opportunities for interest groups who are 
in opposition to the RtF alliance to gain ground.  Therefore, by initiating contact with 
“neglected” political actors, they can effectively ensure that a strong relationship can be 
built. This also moves them from being perceived as adversaries to being more of an ally 
as trust is built. At the same time, this is not to say that the RtF alliance must compromise 
its principles or objectives. Having a relationship in place can create opportunities for the 
RtF allies to give critical and constructive feedback to these actors.  
5. In transitioning democratic contexts, citizen voice is key, especially with respect to food 
sovereignty issues (land, agricultural inputs, and forestry). Part of the success of the RtF 
initiative can be attributed to its tactic of cultivating the community voice, in that they 
build up community members’ capacity to identify their challenges and identify their own 
solutions and build up their confidence to engage with those in positions of power. As 
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much as civil society is acknowledged to play an important role in a democracy, and as 
much as CSOs can bridge civil society and the state, CSOs can be viewed with mistrust 
by those in authority, especially in politically sensitive contexts. This has been the case in 
Myanmar, where the “professionalized” CSOs are not trusted very much by the NLD. On 
the other hand, individual advocates/community representatives are seen to be more 
trustworthy and their contributions are welcomed. As a young “democracy”, the citizen 
voices in Myanmar will need to be nurtured. Farmers need to be encouraged and 
supported to speak up for themselves and present their experiences, highlighting their 
needs and concerns. Experience around the world has shown that a robust grassroots level 
movement is critical in furthering the food sovereignty agenda forward.  
Just as citizen voice is key, women’s role in RtF advocacy needs to be acknowledged. 
This research did not explicitly address the gender dimension and did not harvest 
substantial information about women’s participation. However, when questioned, a Metta 
staff mentioned that women’s participation has at times transformed encounters with duty 
bearers from potentially hostile situations to a peaceful end (focus group discussion, 
January 23, 2019). Metta staff have also acknowledged that because women are in reality 
in charge of family livelihood activities, they are more willing to be outspoken and speak 
up for their needs (focus group discussion, January 23, 2019).   
6. Advocacy efforts require long-term investment. As previously mentioned, policy 
advocacy as a concept is not entirely familiar to Myanmar CSOs. Organizations need to 
take time and invest to train its staff to understand advocacy principles and develop 
effective approaches and strategies. As with advocacy efforts elsewhere in the world, 
most advocacy initiatives do not see their desired change take place over night. More 
GRASSROOTS-INITIATED POLICY ADVOCACY IN A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY 72 
often, success comes about only after years of struggle and engagement with different 
stakeholders. The same allowance needs to be made for Myanmar advocacy efforts as 
well, particularly grassroots based advocacy initiatives.  
7. The Myanmar policy context is complex and layered with seen and unseen practices, 
norms and policies. Further, duty bearers, particularly government departments which are 
supposed to be the primary channels through which service is delivered to rural 
communities, are under-staffed and under-resourced. There are also government staff 
who are entrenched in “old” practices, which are not amenable to the social changes 
sought by RtF advocates. This is a clear sign that structural changes must accompany 
or at least be in place, or any advocacy gains will not persist and affect real change.  
8. There is a question about the sustainability of the initiative beyond the formal project 
period. This is an advocacy initiative that grew out of a project that Metta and Oxfam 
formulated with funding from an external donor. Given that the participating 
organizations are all resource-limited, and have benefited from the support mobilized by 
the project, particularly financial resources, it is questionable whether the project 
momentum can be maintained when the financial support ceases. Therefore, it is vital that 
the RtF initiative fully mobilizes its grassroots base such as community groups and 
farmers’ unions, as it has been doing throughout the past three years, to ensure that these 
groups can continue the advocacy efforts.  
Final notes 
 The research has shown that advocacy initiatives by civil society actors in a sensitive 
political context like Myanmar are often shaped by the more professionalized CSOs in response 
to feedback from communities. These actors have to navigate through hardline political actors, as 
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well as policymakers who may not be fully equipped or prepared to engage with civil society. 
However, when a united front is presented, backed up by evidence and with active grassroots 
participation, the duty-bearers do respond. RtF is an initiative that is nurturing and supporting the 
emergence of strong civil society representatives and voices and building their capacity to 
engage with policy makers on policy issues that directly affect their lives. In doing so, RtF is 
working towards building a civil society in Myanmar which can hold the government 
accountable, support the democratization process of the country, and encourage good governance 
practices. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
  
Theory of Change - Right to Food in Myanmar 
 
 
IMPACT (Myanmar) 
Smallholder farmers, landless and forest dwelling women and 
men in 90 villages in Kachin, Northern and Southern Shan 
provinces in Myanmar realise their right to food sovereignty 
LONG-TERM OUTCOME 
Smallholder farmers, landless & forest dwelling women and men in 90 villages in Kachin, 
Northern and Southern Shan provinces along with Civil Society Alliances influence Govt 
and Pvt sector for adoption and implementation of more responsible laws and policies in 
land, forest, seed and Private Investment to ensure their rights to these resources in line with 
International Environmental and Social Standards 
Govt. and Pvt Sector change and implement policy 
frameworks and governance systems in land, forest, seed 
and private investment. 
National, local CSOs and 
their alliances in 
Myanmar enhance their 
capacity and support 
base to influence Govt & 
Pvt Sector on changing 
land, forest, seed and 
Private Investment 
policies & governance 
systems in favour of their 
right to food 
Civil society form strong 
alliances and enhance their 
capacities in influencing, 
evidence generation and 
accountability tools 
State & local authorities in 
Kachin & Shan effectively 
implement current/ improved 
legal and policy frameworks 
in favor of rights of women 
and men smallholders, 
landless and forest dwellers. 
A2 
A1 
A5 
Government influenced to 
change selected national legal 
and policy frameworks 
enhancing community’s right to 
food in four key sectors- land, 
forests, seeds and investment  
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A6 
Private sector is influenced 
to implement responsible 
practices and investment in 
line with International 
Environmental and Social 
Standards 
A3 A4 
Intermediate O/c 1  
* Participatory Action Research 
to collect evidence on impact of 
land, forestry, seeds & 
investment policies 
* Strengthen and connect state 
and local alliances and networks 
with national level alliances 
(LCG, FSWG and CFWG) 
* Support CSOs networks and 
alliances to develop common 
advocacy and coordination 
strategies for the state to national 
level agenda and national level 
advocacy 
 * Develop skills of 
Communities, alliances on 
evidence generation, 
strategizing, policy review, 
analysis, social accountability,  
gender & conflict resolution  
* Connect Myanmar CSOs to 
Regional, Global platforms 
* Feed local analysis into Global 
Land campaign.  
Intermediate O/c 2  
* Facilitate local 
community 
understanding and 
engagement with 
investors 
* Capacity building of 
community leaders on 
resource mapping and 
monitoring 
* Expose Private Sector 
to international best 
practice standards 
* Produce accessible 
materials on how to 
implement EIA/SIA  
guidelines and share 
with government, PS &  
NSAs 
* Promote Citizen 
Journalism and facilitate 
cover PS good and bad 
practices.  
* Produce policy brief 
on impact of investment  
 
 
Intermediate O/c 3  
* Support National 
Community Forestry WG , 
LCG for research, analysis 
and dissemination on land 
use policy implementation 
and  investment policy  
* Develop policy brief and 
advocacy on changes 
needed to improve 
community forestry, land, 
seed & investment 
policies/ laws 
* Campaign on seed, food 
and culture 
* Promote learning 
through cross learning visit  
 
 
 
Assumptions 
 
CSO Coalition members will 
be able to dissolve differences 
and work towards a common 
platform and understanding 
 
Government will recognise 
CSO Alliance as a legitimate 
party to raise contentious 
issues on Land, Forests, Seeds 
and Impact Investment 
 
Private sector is open to 
cooperate with project for 
understanding and 
implementing International 
Standards 
 
Trainings will be delivered in a 
manner that leads to adequate 
capacities and appropriate 
actions by all stakeholders 
 
State Government Actors open 
to changing their ways of 
working and overcoming 
entrenched interests 
 
Oxfam will be able to provide 
continued thought leadership 
and support to the program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A6 
A1 
A2 
A5 
A3 
A4 
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Appendix B 
Interview Guide – Project Participants (Metta project partners) 
1. Why are you participating in the project? 
2. What have you done with the project (activities, scope, frequency)? 
3. What are the challenges you face with respect to food production and agriculture-based 
livelihood activities?  
4. What do you hope to accomplish by carrying out the activities? 
5. Who do you work with to carry out the activities? Who do you target for your advocacy 
activities? Why? Who has helped? Who has stood in your way (blocked)? 
6. Have you faced any challenges? 
7. What have you learned from taking part in the project? 
8. Is there anything else you would like to share? 
Socio-economic demographic data: 
• Gender, responsibility within partner organization  
Interview Guide – Program staff 
1. How were participating organizations selected? Who is participating in the activities? Why?  
2. Why are you involved in this program?  
3. How are the participants organized? Who makes the decisions/take leading roles?  
4. What are the challenges the communities face with respect to food production and agriculture-
based livelihood activities?  
5. What kind of activities have you designed and implemented? What kind of information did 
you use? From where?  
6. What do you hope to accomplish by carrying out the activities? 
7. Who do you work with to carry out the activities? Who do you target for your advocacy 
activities? Why? Who has helped? Who has stood in your way (blocked)? 
8. What opportunities have you had that helped with implementation? How? Were there any 
missed opportunities? Why did you miss out on the opportunities?  
9. Have you faced any challenges? 
10. What are the lessons learned? 
11. Is there anything else you would like to share? 
Socio-economic demographic data: 
• Gender, role in project (job title, duty location) 
Interview Guide – CSO/Government respondent 
1. What are the challenges the rural communities currently face with respect to food production 
and agriculture-based livelihood activities?  
2. What are the attitudes/positions of policy makers with respect to these issues? 
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3. Who are the decision-makers? What are the opportunities and constraints for engaging in 
advocacy in these thematic areas? 
4. Is there anything else you would like to share? 
Socio-economic demographic data: 
• Gender, job title, organization 
 
 
